REFORM OF CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE
Paper 2 - Prosecution Session



PROSECUTION DISCRETION AND THE USE OF
APPROPRIATE CHARGES

Ian Temby QC
Barrister, New South Wales
 
 
Introduction

The principal participants in the criminal justice process comprise investigators (generally police), prosecutors, defence lawyers, Judges, jurors, witnesses, and the accused. The last is the most important: typically male[1], under 30 years of age[2], of low intelligence or education or both, poor, and addicted to or at least a heavy user of alcohol or an illegal drug. He feels, with some justification, that he is being processed by the system. He has rights, which must be respected. Some contend that he has too many rights, but if they are to be whittled down that must be done very cautiously indeed.

Behind these participants we find the community, on behalf of which the system operates. Members of the public tend to forget that they or their loved ones could well fall foul of the criminal law. They want, and by and large receive, a criminal justice system which is fair, firm and transparent. However they are not inclined to assume the system is free of fault, and nor should they be.


The Standing Committee of Attorneys-General appointed a working group on criminal and trial procedure which in its report[3] stated its aim was to “identify practical areas of reform which offer the greatest potential to reduce criminal trial delay while not impacting unfairly upon the right of every defendant to a fair trial”. Recommendations made include ways of encouraging early pleas of guilty by offering incentives. Much is also said about the prosecutor’s duty of disclosure, and the desirability of forcing increased “co-operation” upon the defence. Little emphasis is placed upon the responsibility of the prosecution to ensure that the charges laid are appropriate. It is with that topic that this paper is concerned.
 
The Accused Will Plead Guilty ...

The common experience of criminal law practitioners in Australia is that a high proportion of convictions follow a plea of guilty. That is more true in the lower courts, but still generally true in the higher courts. During the last year for which figures[4] are available, 1997-1998, about 15% of defendants charged in the higher courts were not subject to final adjudication, because the accused died, or absconded, or charges were withdrawn by the prosecution[5], or an indefinite stay of proceedings was ordered. Of the balance which proceeded to final adjudication, almost precisely 90% of accused were found guilty. That was a result of a guilty plea in 72.5% of cases, which is to say that accused persons were acquitted in a little more than one third of cases fully defended to jury verdict. Out of the pleas of guilty, slightly more than one half were known to be such from the time the case entered the higher court stream, and the remaining defendants changed their plea from not guilty to guilty during proceedings in such courts.

It is a good thing that some defendants plead not guilty, and a very good thing that some are acquitted.[6] But undoubtedly hopeless cases from the viewpoint of the accused are contested, because he is pigheaded or his lawyer is stupid (both features may well be present in a given case), which is bad for the convicted person and wastes resources. And there may well be much opportunity to reduce the proportion of cases in which the guilty plea is forthcoming at a late stage, not early on.

... But Only to Appropriate Charges

The paper under consideration proceeds on the unstated assumption that the problem lies on the defence side, and can best be solved by offering incentives for a guilty plea, particularly if proffered early on. But it may well be the solution, or a large part of it, lies elsewhere.

In a very high proportion of all criminal cases in the higher courts, some involvement by the accused in conduct which is clearly criminal in nature cannot be questioned. In such cases, the real debate centres upon whether the correct charge has been laid in the sense that all elements of it can be proved to the required standard, perhaps coupled with disputation as to the principles of criminal liability. If somebody dies at the hands of another, then generally the debate concerns intent, perhaps self-defence or provocation (the two sometimes being run, uneasily, in harness together), perhaps diminished responsibility by reason of some mental impairment. Generally the real question will be whether the accused should be convicted of murder or manslaughter. Other broadly similar examples could be given in other areas of the criminal law.

The general approach of experienced defence counsel is to recommend to accused persons that they plead guilty to an appropriate charge or charges, but otherwise defend the case. Surely no less would be required of them in any rational, principled system.

It is at least a possibility worthy of serious consideration that in a significant proportion of cases guilty pleas are not offered, or not offered at an early stage, because the prosecuting authorities have selected charges which are inappropriately heavy in the objective circumstances of the case. If and to the extent that happens, remedial action will lead to further guilty pleas and a reduction in delays.

Relevant Guidelines

There is now to be found, at Commonwealth level and in each of the Australian States and internal Territories, a Director of Public Prosecutions operating under statute. Speaking generally, each is charged with making key decisions in relation to prosecutions in a manner which is independent of political and bureaucratic processes. All have published prosecution policies or guidelines.

The most important decision to be made by prosecutors is whether charges should be laid[7]. If so, the second most important follows: what charges? It must be said that the various DPP policies and guidelines are widely various[8] in these and other respects.

Commonwealth prosecutions are atypical, in that they do not deal with ordinary crime.[9] Most of the workload of Commonwealth prosecutors has to do with drug importations and frauds upon the central Government. The “Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth” provides[10]:

“In many cases the evidence will disclose an offence against several different laws. Care must therefore be taken to choose a charge or charges which adequately reflect the nature and extent of the criminal conduct disclosed by the evidence and which will provide the court with an appropriate basis for sentence.”

The succeeding paragraphs of the guidelines state that:

. While in the ordinary course the charge or charges laid will be the most serious disclosed by the evidence, when regard is had to such matters as the strength of the available evidence and probable lines of defence, it may be appropriate to lay a charge which is not the most serious so disclosed.

. “Under no circumstances should charges be laid with the intention of providing scope for subsequent charge bargaining.”

. Ordinarily the provisions of a specific Act, rather than the general provisions of the Crimes Act, should be availed of.

New South Wales has more people and more crime than any other Australian jurisdiction. The official approach in that State is notably pragmatic, as appears from the following excerpts from the Prosecution Policy and Guidelines:[11]

“Charges are to be selected that adequately and appropriately address the criminality alleged and enable the matter to be dealt with expeditiously.”

“Prosecutors should actively pursue the possibility of appropriate charge bargaining and summary disposal ... considering constructively any approach by the accused in that regard.”

In Victoria, the Prosecutorial Guidelines, not changed since 30 June 1993, concentrate upon the decision to prosecute, rather than the choice of charges. The same general comment may be made concerning Tasmania and the Northern Territory.

The Queensland DPP has issued a Statement of Prosecution Policy and Guidelines which includes the following under the heading “Choice of Charges”:

“In many cases the evidence will disclose offences against several different provisions of the criminal law. Prosecutors must ensure that the charge or charges adequately reflect the nature and extent of the criminal conduct disclosed by the evidence and will provide the court with an appropriate basis for sentencing.

In no case must a charge be laid where there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a considered view that there is a reasonable prospect of success in gaining a verdict.

On no account should a more serious charge be laid solely to induce a defendant to engage in plea bargaining.”

The South Australian DPP by its Statement of Prosecution Policy and Guidelines has said something similar, with more than a touch of the Commonwealth approach, namely:[12]

“In many cases the evidence will disclose a number of possible offences. Care must therefore be taken to choose a charge or charges which adequately reflect the nature and extent of the criminal conduct disclosed by the evidence and which will provide the Court with an appropriate basis for sentence.

In the ordinary course the charge or charges laid or proceeded with will be the most serious disclosed by the evidence. Nevertheless, when account is taken of such matters as the strength of the available evidence, the probable lines of defence to a particular charge and other considerations including the appropriate sentence, it may be appropriate to lay or proceed with a charge which is not the most serious revealed by the evidence.

Under no circumstances should charges be laid with the intention of providing scope for subsequent charge-bargaining.”

The guideline in question adds the customary caution about the laying of conspiracy charges.

Possible Changes in Approach

In some jurisdictions published policies and guidelines place no or little emphasis upon choice of charges. That is unfortunate. The general policy rule in the other Australian States and Territories is that charges are to be chosen which adequately reflect the criminal conduct disclosed by the evidence, and which will provide the sentencing judge with an appropriate basis for discharging that function. The Commonwealth and South Australian guidelines go further in stating that in the ordinary course the charge or charges laid will be the most serious disclosed by the evidence. That is, however, made subject to important qualifications having to do with the strength of available evidence and probable lines of defence, and there may be little difference in practical outcome as against the approach urged upon prosecutors in New South Wales and Queensland.

In New South Wales, prosecutors are told to “actively pursue the possibility of appropriate charge bargaining” and to consider “constructively any approach by the accused in that regard”. Surely that is as it should be. The community expects that people who commit serious crimes will, if caught and dealt with, be convicted of an offence and given a sentence which bears a proper relationship to the provable conduct in question. There may, however, be no need to charge the most serious offence of which a jury might find an accused guilty, particularly if the penalty likely to be imposed for that more serious offence is not greater than the maximum available for a somewhat lesser offence of which conviction is practically certain, so that a plea of guilty becomes likely. To give an example, it may be appropriate to charge malicious wounding rather than attempted murder. There seems to be every reason why discussions between prosecutor and defence counsel as to the perceived strength of the prosecution case should be encouraged. To the extent that leads to matters being disposed of following a guilty plea, without derogating from the need to see appropriate convictions obtained and sentences imposed, that is surely a good thing. There will of course still be many cases in which a defended trial is justified.

Role of Judges

Save in most exceptional circumstances, a court cannot instruct a prosecutor as to what the indictment should contain. So much is clear from Maxwell v R.[13] In that case, Dawson and McHugh JJ. said at 513:

“The decision whether to charge a lesser offence, or to accept a plea of guilty to a lesser offence than that charged, is for the prosecution and does not require the approval of the court. Indeed, the Court would seldom have the knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the case on each side which is necessary for the proper exercise of such a function. The role of the prosecution in this respect, as in many others, ‘is such that it cannot be shared with the trial judge without placing in jeopardy the essential independence of that office in the adversary system’. R. v Apostilides (1984) 154 C.L.R. 563 at 575.

In R. v Brown (1989) 17 N.S.W.L.R. 472 at 479-480, the Court of Criminal Appeal recognised the substantial practical limitations imposed upon the power of the courts to control the exercise by prosecuting authorities - of their discretion in such matters as the choice of a plea with which an accused is to be charged or the acceptance of a plea of guilty to a particular charge. The Court rightly observed that the most important sanctions governing the proper performance of a prosecuting authority’s functions are likely to be political rather than legal. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that in an appropriate case a court may need to give effect to its own right to prevent an abuse of process. That conclusion is undoubtedly correct, but the need for a court to exercise its inherent power to protect its own process should in this context rarely, if ever, arise. A mere difference of opinion between the court and the prosecuting authority could never give rise to an abuse of process.”


In that last respect, Gaudron and Gummow JJ. said at 535:

“It follows from the nature of a criminal trial, in which the prosecution bears the onus of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, that it cannot be an abuse of process to proceed on a lesser charge, ... merely because there is evidence which, if accepted, would sustain a more serious offence.”


The same learned judges said at 534:

“It ought now be accepted, in our view, that certain decisions involved in the prosecution process are, of their nature, insusceptible of judicial review. They include decisions whether or not to prosecute, to enter a nolle prosequi, to proceed ex officio, whether or not to present evidence, and, which is usually an aspect of one or other of those decisions, decisions as to the particular charge to be laid or prosecuted. The integrity of the judicial process - particularly, its independence and impartiality and the public perception thereof - would be compromised if the courts were to decide or were to be in any way concerned with decisions as to who is to be prosecuted and for what.”


Conclusion

Prosecuting authorities throughout Australia should be encouraged to ensure that their policies and guidelines:

. deal with the question of choice of charges;

. require prosecutors to ensure that the charge or charges laid adequately reflect the criminal conduct disclosed by admissible evidence, and will provide the court with an appropriate basis for sentencing; and

. sanction discussions with defence counsel with a view to facilitating the appropriate choice of charges.

If acted upon, the approach urged would help reduce delays without in any way compromising a principled approach. Finally, it is important that judges maintain, in this as in other respects, their roles as neutral and disinterested referees.
 
 
Endnotes
 

[1] Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Higher Criminal Courts, Australia, 1997-1998" - 88% of finalised defendants were male.
[2] ABS, as above - 51.5% of defendants finalised in the relevant year were aged 17-29.
[3] Issued September 1999.
[4] ABS, as above.
[5] These cases may reward further study: were a significant proportion of the cases withdrawn perhaps over-charged in the first instance?
[6] Prosecution services with a conviction rate approaching 100% are either excessively timid, or to be found in authoritarian States.
[7] The most important, but not the most difficult. Decisions whether to grant an indemnity, so a potential accused becomes a witness, are fraught with difficulty.
[8] The lack of orthodoxy is bewildering: is there not a best practice available?
[9] Murders, burglaries and so on.
[10] Paras. 2.18-2.22.
[11] Issued March 1998 - paras. 3 and 4.
[12] Issued July 1999- Guideline No. 1.
[13] (1996) 184 C.L.R. 501